The Obama administration’s plan to spend an estimated $1 trillion dollars over 30 years on rebuilding the nation’s nuclear facilities and modernizing nuclear weapons was part of an effort in 2014 to control nuclear arms globally. Instead, The New York Times reports, “the United States, Russia and China are now aggressively pursuing a new generation of smaller, less destructive nuclear weapons…[which] threaten to revive a Cold War-era arms race….”
The Fiscal Times requested and was granted permission from the Federation of American Scientists to reprint this article on Nuclear Transparency and the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan by Hans M. Kristensen.
I was reading the latest Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan from the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and wondering what I should pick to critique the Obama administration’s nuclear policy.
Related: Why Adding $1 Trillion for Nuclear Arms Might Be a Bad Idea
After all, there are plenty of issues that deserve to be addressed, including:
- Why NNSA continues to overspend, over-commit, and create a spending bow wave in 2021-2026 in excess of the President’s budget in exactly the same time period that excessive Air Force and Navy modernization programs are expected to put the greatest pressure on defense spending?
- Why a smaller and smaller nuclear weapons stockpile with fewer warhead types appears to be getting more and more expensive to maintain?
- Why each warhead life-extension program is getting ever more ambitious and expensive with no apparent end in sight?
- And why a policy of reductions, no new nuclear weapons, no pursuit of new military missions or new capabilities for nuclear weapons, restraint, a pledge to “put an end to Cold War thinking,” and the goal of disarmament, instead became a blueprint for nuclear overreach with record funding, across-the-board modernizations, unprecedented warhead modifications, increasing weapons accuracy and effectiveness, reaffirmation of a Triad and non-strategic nuclear weapons, continuation of counterforce strategy, reaffirmation of the importance and salience of nuclear weapons, and an open-ended commitment to retain nuclear weapons further into the future than they have existed so far?
What About The Other Nuclear-Armed States?
Despite the contradictions and flaws of the administration’s nuclear policy, however, imagine if the other nuclear-armed states also published summaries of their nuclear weapons plans. Some do disclose a little, but they could do much more. For others, however, the thought of disclosing any information about the size and composition of their nuclear arsenal seems so alien that it is almost inconceivable.
Related: The 8 Most Important Things to Know About the Iran Nuclear Deal
Yet that is actually one of the reasons why it is necessary to continue to work for greater (or sufficient) transparency in nuclear forces. Some nuclear-armed states believe their security depends on complete or near-compete nuclear secrecy. And, of course, some nuclear information must be protected from disclosure. But the problem with excessive secrecy is that it tends to fuel uncertainty, rumors, suspicion, exaggerations, mistrust, and worst-case assumptions in other nuclear-armed states – reactions that cause them to shape their own nuclear forces and strategies in ways that undermine security for all.
Nuclear-armed states must find a balance between legitimate secrecy and transparency. This can take a long time and it may not necessarily be the same from country to country. The United States also used to keep much more nuclear information secret and there are many institutions that will always resist public access. But maximum responsible disclosure, it turns out, is not only necessary for a healthy public debate about nuclear policy, it is also necessary to communicate to allies and adversaries what that policy is about – and, equally important, to dispel rumors and misunderstandings about what the policy is not.
Nuclear transparency is not just about pleasing the arms controllers – it is important for national security.
So here are some thoughts about what other nuclear-armed states should (or could) disclose about their nuclear arsenals – not to disclose everything but to improve communication about the role of nuclear weapons and avoid misunderstandings and counterproductive surprises:
Russia should publish:
- Full New START aggregate data numbers (these numbers are already shared with the United States, which publishes its own numbers)
- Size and history of overall nuclear weapons stockpile
- Number of history of nuclear warhead dismantlement (has made statements about percentage reductions since 1991 but not disclosed numbers or history)
- Basic overview of which nuclear forces are nuclear-capable (has made some statements about strategic forces but not shorter-range forces)
- Plans for future years force levels of long-range nuclear forces (has made occasional statements about modernizations but no detailed plan)
- Overall status and out-year budgets for nuclear weapons and nuclear forces
China should publish:
- Size and history of overall nuclear weapons stockpile (stated in 2004 that it possessed the smallest arsenal of the nuclear weapon states but has not disclosed numbers or history)
- Basic overview of its nuclear-capable forces
- Plans for future years force levels of long-range nuclear forces
- Overall status and out-year budgets for nuclear weapons and nuclear forces
France should publish:
- History of overall nuclear weapons stockpile (has disclosed the size of its nuclear stockpile in 2008 and 2015 (300 weapons), but not the history)
- Number and history of nuclear warhead dismantlement (has declared dismantlement of some types but not history)
(France has disclosed its overall force structure and some nuclear budget information is published each year.)
Britain should publish:
- History of overall nuclear weapons stockpile (has declared some approximate historic numbers, declared the approximate size in 2010 (no more than 225), and has declared plan for mid-2020s (no more than 180), but has not disclosed history)
- Number and history of nuclear warhead dismantlement (has announced dismantlement of systems but not numbers or history)
(Britain has published information about the size of its nuclear force structure and part of its nuclear budget.)
Pakistan should publish:
- History of overall nuclear weapons stockpile
- Basic overview of nuclear-capable forces (occasionally declares that a missile test involves nuclear-capable weapon)
- Plans for future years force levels of longer-range nuclear forces
- Overall status and out-year budgets for nuclear weapons and nuclear forces
India should publish:
- History of overall nuclear weapons stockpile
- Basic overview of nuclear-capable forces (occasionally declares that a missile test involves nuclear-capable weapon)
- Plans for future years force levels of longer-range nuclear forces
- Overall status and out-year budgets for nuclear weapons and nuclear forces
Israel should publish:
…or should it? Unlike other nuclear-armed states, Israel has not publicly confirmed it has a nuclear arsenal and has said it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Some argue Israel should not confirm or declare anything because of fear it would trigger nuclear arms programs in other Middle Eastern countries.
On the other hand, the existence of the Israeli nuclear arsenal is well known to other countries as has been documented by declassified government documents in the United States. Official confirmation would be politically sensitive but not in itself change national security in the region. Moreover, the secrecy fuels speculations, exaggerations, accusations, and worst-case planning. And it is hard to see how the future of nuclear weapons in the Middle East can be addressed and resolved without some degree of official disclosure.
North Korea should publish:
Well, obviously this nuclear-armed state is a little different (to put it mildly) because its blustering nuclear threats and statements – and the nature of its leadership itself – make it difficult to trust any official information. Perhaps this is a case where it would be more valuable to hear more about what foreign intelligence agencies know about North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. Yet official disclosure could potentially serve an important role as part of a future de-tension agreement with North Korea.
